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Abstract
The rise of connected personal devices together with privacy concerns call for machine learning
algorithms capable of leveraging the data of a large number of agents to learn personalized models under
strong privacy requirements. In this paper, we introduce an efficient algorithm to address the above
problem in a fully decentralized (peer-to-peer) and asynchronous fashion, with provable convergence
rate. We show how to make the algorithm differentially private to protect against the disclosure of
information about the personal datasets, and formally analyze the trade-off between utility and privacy.
Our experiments show that our approach dramatically outperforms previous work in the non-private case,
and that under privacy constraints, we can significantly improve over models learned in isolation.
1 Introduction
Connected personal devices are now widespread: they can collect and process increasingly large and sensitive
user data. As a concrete example, consider the health domain. Smart watches can record cardiac activities,
mobile apps encourage users to participate to studies (about depression, concussion, etc.),1 and recent painless
sensors can replace a finger prick for blood glucose testing (Cappon et al., 2017). Such information can be
leveraged through machine learning to provide useful personalized services (e.g., personalized treatments)
to the user/patient. A common practice is to centralize data from all devices on an external server for
batch processing, sometimes without explicit consent from users and with little oversight. While this data
concentration is ideal for the utility of the learning process, it raises serious privacy concerns and opens the
door to potential misuse (e.g., exploitation for the purpose of recruitment, insurance pricing or granting
loans). Therefore, in applications where the data is considered too sensitive to be shared (due to legislation
or because the user opts out), one has to learn on each device separately without taking advantage of the
multiplicity of data sources (e.g., information from similar users). This preserves privacy but leads to poor
accuracy, in particular for new or moderately active users who have not collected much data.
Instead of the above two extreme approaches, our goal is to design a solution allowing a large number of
users (agents) to collaborate so as to learn more accurate personalized models while ensuring that their
data stay on their local device and that the algorithm does not leak sensitive information to others. We
consider a fully decentralized solution where agents operate asynchronously and communicate over a network
in a peer-to-peer fashion, without any central entity to maintain a global state of the system or even to
coordinate the protocol. The network acts as a communication network but also models similarities between
users. While a decentralized architecture may be the only available option in some applications (e.g., IoT), it
also provides interesting benefits when a more traditional distributed (master/slave) architecture could be
∗first.last@inria.fr
†first.last@epfl.ch
1See e.g., https://www.apple.com/researchkit/
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used. In particular, peer-to-peer algorithms provide scalability-by-design to large sets of devices thanks to
the locality of their updates (Kermarrec and Taïani, 2015). For instance, it was recently shown that fully
decentralized learning algorithms can perform better than their distributed counterparts because they avoid
a communication bottleneck at the master node (Lian et al., 2017). Finally, a decentralized architecture
intrinsically provides some security guarantees as it becomes much more difficult for any party (or any external
adversary) to observe the full state of the system.
The problem of decentralized collaborative learning of personal models has been recently considered by
Vanhaesebrouck et al. (2017), but they did not consider any privacy constraints. In fact, while there has
been a large body of work on privacy-preserving machine learning from centralized data, notably based on
differential privacy (see Dwork and Roth, 2014; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Bassily et al., 2014, and references
therein), the case where sensitive datasets are distributed across multiple data owners has been much less
studied, let alone the fully decentralized setting. Existing approaches for privacy-preserving distributed
learning (see e.g., Pathak et al., 2010; Rajkumar and Agarwal, 2012; Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015; Huang
et al., 2015) rely on a central (sometimes trusted) server, assume the local data distribution is the same for
all users and/or are designed to learn a single global model rather than a personal model for each user.
In this paper, we ask a challenging question: given the above decentralization and privacy constraints, can
agents improve upon their purely local models through collaboration? Our contributions towards a positive
answer to this question are three-fold. First, we propose a decentralized and asynchronous block coordinate
descent algorithm to address the problem in the non-private setting. Taking advantage of the structure of the
problem, this algorithm has simple updates and provable convergence rates, improving upon the previous
work of Vanhaesebrouck et al. (2017). Second, we design a differentially-private scheme based on randomly
perturbing each update of our algorithm. This scheme guarantees that the messages sent by the users over
the network during the execution of the algorithm do not reveal significant information about any data point
of any local dataset. We provide a formal analysis of the utility loss due to privacy. Third, we conduct
experiments on synthetic and real-world data to validate our approach. The empirical results show that the
trade-off between utility and privacy is in line with our theoretical findings, and that under strong privacy
constraints we can still outperform the purely local models in terms of accuracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the problem setting and presents our
decentralized algorithm for the non-private case. Section 3 introduces a differentially private version and
analyzes the trade-off between utility and privacy. In Section 4, we discuss some related work on decentralized
and private learning. Finally, Section 5 is dedicated to numerical experiments. Detailed proofs can be found
in the supplementary material.
2 Peer-to-Peer Personalized Learning with Coordinate Descent
We start by formally describing the learning problem that we address in this paper.
2.1 Problem Setting
We consider a set of n agents. Each agent i has a local data distribution µi over the space X × Y and has
access to a set Si = {(xji , yji )}mij=1 of mi ≥ 0 training examples drawn i.i.d. from µi. The goal of agent i is
to learn a model θ ∈ Rp with small expected loss E(xi,yi)∼µi [`(θ;xi, yi)], where the loss function `(θ;xi, yi)
is convex in θ and measures the performance of θ on data point (xi, yi). In the setting where agent i must
learn on its own, a standard approach is to select the model minimizing the local (potentially regularized)
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empirical loss:
θloci ∈ arg min
θ∈Rp
[ 1
mi
mi∑
j=1
`(θ;xji , y
j
i ) + λi‖θ‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Li(θ;Si)
]
, (1)
with λi ≥ 0. In this paper, agents do not learn in isolation but rather participate in a decentralized peer-
to-peer network over which they can exchange information. Such collaboration gives them the opportunity
to learn a better model than (1), for instance by allowing some agents to compensate for their lack of data.
Formally, let JnK = {1, . . . , n} and G = (JnK, E,W ) be a weighted connected graph over the set of agents
where E ∈ JnK× JnK is the set of edges and W ∈ Rn×n is a nonnegative weight matrix. Wij gives the weight
of edge (i, j) ∈ E with the convention that Wij = 0 if (i, j) /∈ E or i = j. Following previous work (see e.g.,
Evgeniou and Pontil, 2004; Vanhaesebrouck et al., 2017), we assume that the edge weights reflect a notion of
“task relatedness”: the weight Wij between agents i and j tends to be large if the models minimizing their
respective expected loss are similar. These pairwise similarity weights may be derived from user profiles
(e.g., in the health domain: weight, size, diabetes type, etc.) or directly from the local datasets, and can be
computed in a private way (see e.g., Goethals et al., 2004; Alaggan et al., 2011).
In order to scale to large networks, our goal is to design fully decentralized algorithms: each agent i only
communicates with its neighborhood Ni = {j : Wij > 0} without global knowledge of the network, and
operates without synchronizing with other agents. Overall, the problem can thus be seen as a multi-task
learning problem over a large number of tasks (agents) with imbalanced training sets, and which must be
solved in a fully decentralized way.
2.2 Objective Function
Our goal is to jointly learn the models of the agents by leveraging both their local datasets and the similarity
information embedded in the network graph. Following a well-established principle in the multi-task learning
literature (Evgeniou and Pontil, 2004; Maurer, 2006; Dhillon et al., 2011), we use graph regularization to
favor models that vary smoothly on the graph. Specifically, representing the set of all models Θi ∈ Rp as a
stacked vector Θ = [Θ1; . . . ; Θn] ∈ Rnp, the objective function we wish to minimize is given by
QL(Θ) = 1
2
n∑
i<j
Wij‖Θi −Θj‖2 + µ
n∑
i=1
DiiciLi(Θi;Si), (2)
where µ > 0 is a trade-off parameter, Dii =
∑n
j=1Wij is a normalization factor and ci ∈ (0, 1] ∝ mi is the
“confidence” of agent i.2 Minimizing (2) implements a trade-off between having similar models for strongly
connected agents and models that are accurate on their respective local datasets (the higher the confidence of
an agent, the more importance given to the latter part). This allows agents to leverage relevant information
from their neighbors — it is particularly salient for agents with less data which can gain useful knowledge
from better-endowed neighbors without “polluting” others with their own inaccurate model. Note that the
objective (2) includes the two extreme cases of learning purely local models as in (1) (when µ → ∞) and
learning a single global model (for µ→ 0).
We now discuss a few assumptions and properties of QL. We assume that for any i ∈ JnK, the local loss
function Li of agent i is convex in its first argument with Lloci -Lipschitz continuous gradient. This implies that
QL is convex in Θ.3 If we further assume that each Li is σloci -strongly convex with σloci > 0 (this is the case for
instance when the local loss is L2-regularized), then QL is σ-strongly convex with σ ≥ µmin1≤i≤n[Diiciσloci ] >
0. In other words, for any Θ,Θ′ ∈ Rnp we have QL(Θ′) ≥ QL(Θ) +∇QL(Θ)T (Θ′ −Θ) + σ2 ‖Θ′ −Θ‖22. The
2In practice we will set ci = mi/maxj mj (plus some small constant when mi = 0).
3This follows from the fact that the first term in (2) is a Laplacian quadratic form, hence convex in Θ.
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partial derivative of QL(Θ) w.r.t. the variables in Θi is given by
[∇QL(Θ)]i = Dii(Θi + µci∇Li(Θi;Si))−
∑
j∈NiWijΘj . (3)
We define the matrices Ui ∈ Rnp×p, i ∈ JnK, such that (U1, . . . , Un) = Inp. For i ∈ [n], the i-th block Lipschitz
constant Li of ∇QL(Θ) satisfies ‖[∇QL(Θ +Uid)]i − [∇QL(Θ)]i‖ ≤ Li‖d‖ for any Θ ∈ Rnp and d ∈ Rp. It is
easy to see that Li = Dii(1 + µciLloci ). We denote Lmin = mini Li and Lmax = maxi Li.
2.3 Non-Private Decentralized Algorithm
For ease of presentation, we first present a non-private decentralized algorithm. Note that this is interesting in
its own right as the proposed solution improves upon the algorithm previously proposed by Vanhaesebrouck
et al. (2017), see Section 4 for a discussion.
Time and communication models. Our goal is to minimize the objective function (2) in a fully decen-
tralized manner. Specifically, we operate in the asynchronous time model (Boyd et al., 2006): each agent
has a local clock ticking at the times of a rate 1 Poisson process, and wakes up when it ticks. This is in
contrast to the synchronous model where agents wake up jointly according to a global clock (and thus need to
wait for everyone to finish each round). As local clocks are i.i.d., we can equivalently consider a single clock
which ticks when one of the local clocks ticks. This provides a more convenient way to state and analyze the
algorithms in terms of a global clock counter t (which is unknown to the agents). For communication, we
rely on a broadcast-based model (Aysal et al., 2009; Nedic, 2011) where agents send messages to all their
neighbors at once (without expecting a reply). This model is very appealing in wireless distributed systems,
as sending a message to all neighbors has the same cost as sending to a single neighbor.
Algorithm. We propose a decentralized coordinate descent algorithm to minimize (2). We initialize the
algorithm with an arbitrary set of local models Θ(0) = [Θi(0); . . . ; Θn(0)]. At time step t, an agent i wakes
up. Two consecutive actions are then performed by i:
• Update step: agent i updates its local model based on the most recent information Θj(t) received from
its neighbors j ∈ Ni:
Θi(t+ 1) = Θi(t)− (1/Li)[∇QL(Θ(t))]i (4)
= (1− α)Θi(t) + α
(∑
j∈Ni
Wij
Dii
Θj(t)− µci∇Li(Θi(t);Si)
)
,
where α = 1/(1 + µciLloci ) ∈ (0, 1].
• Broadcast step: agent i sends its updated model Θi(t+ 1) to its neighborhood Ni.
The update step (4) consists in a block coordinate descent update with respect to Θi and only requires
agent i to know the models Θj(t) previously broadcast by its neighbors j ∈ Ni. Note that the agent does
not need to know the global iteration counter t, hence no global clock is needed. The algorithm is thus
fully decentralized and asynchronous. Interestingly, notice that this block coordinate descent update is
adaptive to the confidence level of each agent in two respects: (i) globally, the more confidence, the more
importance given to the gradient of the local loss compared to the neighbors’ models, and (ii) locally, when
Θi(t) is close to a minimizer of the local loss Li (which is the case for instance if we initialize Θi(0) to such a
minimizer), agents with low confidence will trust their neighbors’ models more aggressively than agents with
high confidence (which will make more conservative updates).4 This is in line with the intuition that agents
with low confidence should diverge more quickly from their local minimizer than those with high confidence.
Convergence analysis. Under our assumption that the local clocks of the agents are i.i.d., the above
algorithm can be seen as a randomized block coordinate descent algorithm (Wright, 2015). It enjoys a fast
linear convergence rate when QL is strongly convex, as shown in the following result.
4This second property is in contrast to a (centralized) gradient descent approach which would use the same constant, more
conservative step size (equal to the standard Lipschitz constant of QL) for all agents.
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Proposition 1 (Convergence rate). For T > 0, let (Θ(t))Tt=1 be the sequence of iterates generated by the
proposed algorithm running for T iterations from an initial point Θ(0) ∈ Rnp. Let Q?L ∈ minΘ∈Rnp QL(Θ).
When QL is σ-strongly convex, we have:
E [QL(Θ(T ))−Q?L] ≤
(
1− σ
nLmax
)T
(QL(Θ(0))−Q∗L) .
Proof. This follows from a slight adaptation of the proof of Wright (2015) (Theorem 1 therein) to the block
coordinate descent case. Note that the result can also be obtained as a special case of our Theorem 2 (later
introduced in Section 3.2) by setting the noise scale si(t) = 0 for all t, i.
Remark 1. For general convex QL, an O(1/t) rate can be obtained, see Wright (2015) for details.
Proposition 1 shows that each iteration shrinks the suboptimality gap by a constant factor. While this
factor degrades linearly with the number of agents n, this is compensated by the fact that the number of
iterations done in parallel also scales roughly linearly with n (because agents operate asynchronously and
in parallel). We thus expect the algorithm to scale gracefully with the size of the network if the number of
updates per agent remains constant. The value σLmax ≥
µmin1≤i≤n[Diiciσloci ]
max1≤i≤n[Dii(1+µciLloci )]
> 0 is the ratio between the
lower and upper bound on the curvature of QL. Focusing on the relative differences between agents and
assuming constant σloci ’s and Lloci ’s, it indicates that the algorithm converges faster when the degree-weighted
confidence of agents is approximately the same. On the other hand, two types of agents can represent a
bottleneck for the convergence rate: (i) a high-confidence and high-degree agent (the overall progress is then
very dependent on the updates of that particular agent), and (ii) a low-confidence, poorly connected agent
(hence converging slowly).
3 Differentially Private Algorithm
As described above, the algorithm introduced in the previous section has many interesting properties. However,
while there is no direct exchange of data between agents, the sequence of iterates broadcast by an agent may
reveal information about its private dataset through the gradient of the local loss. In this section, we define
our privacy model and introduce an appropriate scheme to make our algorithm differentially private. We
study its utility loss and the trade-off between utility and privacy.
3.1 Privacy Model
At a high level, our goal is to prevent eavesdropping attacks. We assume the existence of an adversary who
observes all the information sent over the network during the execution of the algorithm, but cannot access
the agents’ internal memory. We want to ensure that such an adversary cannot learn much information about
any individual data point of any agent’s dataset. This is a very strong notion of privacy: each agent does not
trust any other agent or any third-party to process its data, hence the privacy-preserving mechanism must be
implemented at the agent level. Furthermore, note that our privacy model protects any agent against all
other agents even if they collude (i.e., share the information they receive).5
To formally define this privacy model, we rely on the notion of Differential Privacy (DP) (Dwork, 2006),
which has emerged as a powerful measure of how much information about any individual entry of a
dataset is contained in the output of an algorithm. Formally, let M be a randomized mechanism taking
a dataset as input, and let  > 0, δ ≥ 0. We say that M is (, δ)-differentially private if for all datasets
5We assume a honest-but-curious model for the agents: they want to learn as much as possible from the information that
they receive but they truthfully follow the protocol.
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S = {z1, . . . , zi, . . . , zm},S ′ = {z1, . . . , z′i, . . . , zm} differing in a single data point and for all sets of possible
outputs O ⊆ range(M), we have:
Pr(M(S) ∈ O) ≤ ePr(M(S ′) ∈ O) + δ, (5)
where the probability is over the randomness of the mechanism. At a high level, one can see (5) as ensuring
thatM(S) does not leak much information about any individual data point contained in S. DP has many
attractive properties: in particular it provides strong robustness against background knowledge attacks and
does not rely on computational assumptions. The composition of several DP mechanisms remains DP, albeit
a graceful degradation in the parameters (see Dwork et al., 2010; Kairouz et al., 2015, for strong composition
results). We refer to Dwork and Roth (2014) for more details on DP.
In our setting, following the notations of (5), each agent i runs a mechanismMi(Si) which takes its local
dataset Si and outputs all the information sent by i over the network during the execution of the algorithm
(i.e., the sequence of iterates broadcast by the agent). Our goal is to makeMi(Si) (, δ)-DP for all agents i
simultaneously. Note that learning purely local models (1) is a perfectly private baseline according to the
above definition as agents do not exchange any information. Below, we present a way to collaboratively learn
better models while preserving privacy.
3.2 Privacy-Preserving Scheme
The privacy-preserving version of our algorithm consists in replacing the update step in (4) by the following
one (assuming that at time t agent i wakes up):
Θ˜i(t+ 1) = (1− α)Θ˜i(t) + α
(∑
j∈Ni
Wij
Dii
Θ˜j(t)− µci(∇Li(Θ˜i(t);Si) + ηi(t))
)
, (6)
where ηi(t) ∼ Laplace(0, si(t))p ∈ Rp is a noise vector drawn from a Laplace distribution with finite scale
si(t) ≥ 0.6 The difference with the non-private update is that agent i adds appropriately scaled Laplace noise
to the gradient of its local loss Li. It then sends the resulting noisy iterate Θ˜i(t+ 1), instead of Θi(t+ 1), to
its neighbors. Note that for full generality, we allow the noise to potentially depend on the global iteration
number t, as we will see towards the end of this section that it opens interesting perspectives.
Assume that update (6) is run Ti times by agent i within the total T > 0 iterations across the network.
Let Ti = {tki }Tik=1 be the set of iterations at which agent i woke up and consider the mechanismMi(Si) =
{Θ˜i(ti + 1) : ti ∈ Ti}. The following theorem shows how to scale the noise at each iteration, si(ti), so as to
provide the desired overall differential privacy guarantees.
Theorem 1 (Differential privacy ofMi). Let i ∈ JnK and assume that Li(θ;Si) = 1mi ∑mik=1 `i(θ;xki , yki ) +
λi‖θ‖2 where `(·;x, y) is L0-Lipschitz with respect to the L1-norm for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y. For any ti ∈ Ti, let
si(ti) =
2L0
i(ti)mi
for some i(ti) > 0. For any δ¯i ∈ [0, 1] and initial point Θ˜(0) ∈ Rnp independent of Si, the
mechanismMi(Si) is (¯i, δ¯i)-DP with
¯i = min
{∑Ti
ti=1
i(ti),
∑Ti
ti=1
(ei(ti)−1)i(ti)
ei(ti)+1
+
√∑Ti
ti=1
2i(ti)2 log
(
e+
√∑Ti
ti=1
i(ti)2/δ¯i
)
,∑Ti
ti=1
(ei(ti)−1)i(ti)
ei(ti)+1
+
√∑Ti
ti=1
2i(ti)2 log(1/δ¯i)
}
.
Remark 2. We can obtain a similar result if we assume L0-Lipschitzness of ` w.r.t. L2-norm (instead of
L1) and use Gaussian noise (instead of Laplace). Details are in the supplementary material.
Theorem 1 shows thatMi(Si) is (¯i, 0)-DP for ¯i =
∑Ti
ti=1
i(ti). One can also achieve a better scaling for ¯i
at the cost of setting δ¯i > 0 (see Kairouz et al., 2015, for a discussion of the trade-offs in the composition of
6We use the convention Laplace(0, 0) = 0 w.p. 1.
6
DP mechanisms). The noise scale needed to guarantee DP for an agent i is inversely proportional to the size
mi of its local dataset Si. This is a classic property of DP, but it is especially appealing in our collaborative
formulation as the confidence weights ci’s tune down the importance of agents with small datasets (preventing
their noisy information to spread) and give more importance to agents with larger datasets (who propagate
useful information). Our next result quantifies how the added noise affects the convergence.
Theorem 2 (Utility loss). For any T > 0, let (Θ˜(t))Tt=1 be the sequence of iterates generated by T iterations
of update (6) from an initial point Θ˜(0) ∈ Rnp. For σ-strongly convex QL, we have:
E
[
QL(Θ˜(T ))−Q?L
]
≤
(
1− σ
nLmax
)T (
QL(Θ˜(0))−Q?L
)
+
1
nLmin
T−1∑
t=0
n∑
i=1
(
1− σ
nLmax
)t(
µDiicisi(t)
)2
.
This result shows that the error of the private algorithm after T iterations decomposes into two terms. The
first term is the same as in the non-private setting and decreases with T . The second term gives an additive
error due to the noise, which takes the form of a weighted sum of the variance of the noise added to the
iterate at each iteration (note that we indeed recover the non-private convergence rate of Proposition 1 when
the noise scale is 0). When the noise scale used by each agent is constant across iterations, this additive error
converges to a finite number as T → ∞. The number of iterations T rules the trade-off between the two
terms. We give more details in the supplementary material and study this numerically in Section 5.
In practical scenarios, each agent i has an overall privacy budget (¯i, δ¯i). Assume that the agents agree on
a value for T (e.g., using Proposition 1 to achieve the desired precision). Each agent i is thus expected to
wake up Ti = T/n times, and can use Theorem 1 to appropriately distribute its privacy budget across the Ti
iterations and stop after Ti updates. A simple and practical strategy is to distribute the budget equally across
the Ti iterations. Yet, Theorem 2 suggests that better utility can be achieved if the noise scale increases with
time. Assume that agents know in advance the clock schedule for a particular run of the algorithm, i.e. agent
i knows the global iterations Ti at which it will wake up. The following result gives the noise allocation policy
minimizing the utility loss.
Proposition 2. Let C = 1 − σ/nLmax and for any agent i ∈ JnK define λTi(i) = ∑t∈Ti 3√C−13√CT−1 3√Ct.
Assuming si(ti) = 2L0i(ti)mi for ti ∈ Ti as in Theorem 1, the following privacy parameters optimize the utility
loss while ensuring the budget ¯i is matched exactly:
i(t) =
{
3√
C−1
3√
CT−1
3
√
Ct ¯iλTi (i)
for t ∈ Ti,
0 otherwise.
The above noise allocation policy requires agents to know in advance the schedule and the global iteration
counter. This is an unrealistic assumption in the fully decentralized setting where no global clock is available.
Still, Proposition 2 may be useful to design heuristic strategies that are practical, for instance, based on using
the expected global time for the agent to wake up at each of its iterations. We leave this for future work.
Remark 3. Theorem 2 implies that a good warm start point Θ(0) is beneficial. However, Θ(0) must be DP.
In the supplementary material, we show how to generate a private warm start based on propagating perturbed
versions of purely local models in the network.
4 Related Work
Decentralized ML. Most of the work in fully decentralized learning and optimization has focused on the
distributed consensus problem, where the goal is to find a single global model which minimizes the sum of
the local loss functions (Nedic and Ozdaglar, 2009; Ram et al., 2010; Duchi et al., 2012; Wei and Ozdaglar,
2012; Colin et al., 2016). In contrast, we tackle the case where agents have distinct objectives.
7
0 500 1000 1500
Iteration number
2
4
6
Ob
je
ct
iv
e 
fu
nc
tio
n
CD (ours)
ADMM
0 500 1000 1500
Iteration number
0.7
0.8
0.9
Te
st
 a
cc
ur
ac
y
0 5000 10000
Number of vectors transmitted
2
4
6
Ob
je
ct
iv
e 
fu
nc
tio
n
0 5000 10000
Number of vectors transmitted
0.7
0.8
0.9
Te
st
 a
cc
ur
ac
y
Figure 1: Our Coordinate Descent (CD) algorithm compared to the existing ADMM algorithm.
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Figure 2: Linear classification results in the private setting (averaged over 5 runs). (a)-(b) Evolution of
the objective and test accuracy along the iterations for two types of initialization (p = 100). (c) Final test
accuracy for different dimensions and several privacy regimes. Best seen in color.
The work of Vanhaesebrouck et al. (2017) recently studied the problem of decentralized learning of personalized
models and is hence more closely related to our approach, but they did not consider any privacy constraints.
At the cost of introducing many auxiliary variables, they cast the objective function as a partial consensus
problem over the network which can be solved using a decentralized gossip ADMM algorithm (Wei and
Ozdaglar, 2013). Our contributions extend over this previous work in several respects: (i) we propose a
simpler block coordinate descent algorithm with linear convergence rate, which also proves to be much faster
in practice (see Section 5), (ii) we design a differentially private algorithm and provide an analysis of the
resulting privacy/utility trade-off, and (iii) we present an evaluation of our approach on real data (in addition
to synthetic experiments).
DP in distributed learning. Differential Privacy has been mostly considered in the context where a
“trusted curator” has access to all data. Existing DP schemes for learning in this setting typically rely on the
addition of noise to the learned model (output perturbation) or to the objective function itself (objective
perturbation), see for instance Chaudhuri et al. (2011).
The private multi-party setting, in which sensitive datasets are distributed across multiple data owners, is
known to be harder (McGregor et al., 2010) and has been less studied in spite of its relevance for many
applications. Local DP (Duchi et al., 2012; Kairouz et al., 2016), consisting in locally perturbing the data
points themselves before releasing them, often achieves poor accuracy (especially when local datasets are
small). In the master/slave setting, DP algorithms have been introduced to learn a private global model,
either by aggregating models trained locally by each party (Pathak et al., 2010; Hamm et al., 2016) or
by perturbing the gradients and/or the objective in a distributed gradient descent algorithm (Song et al.,
2013; Rajkumar and Agarwal, 2012; Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015). Some of these approaches rely on the
assumption that local datasets are drawn from the same global distribution. The work of Huang et al. (2015)
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Purely local models Non-priv. CD Priv. ¯ = 1 Priv. ¯ = 0.5 Priv. ¯ = 0.1
Per-user test RMSE 1.2834 0.9502 0.9527 0.9545 0.9855
Table 1: Per-user test RMSE (averaged over users and 5 random runs) on MovieLens-100K.
considers the decentralized setting, using a privacy model similar to ours. However, they still learn a single
global model and it is not clear how their algorithm and analysis can be adapted to our multi-task problem.
Moreover, their approach is synchronous, relies on additional assumptions (e.g., bounded second derivatives)
and does not have established convergence rates.
We conclude this section by briefly mentioning the recent work of Hitaj et al. (2017) describing an attack
against differentially private collaborative deep learning approaches (such as Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015).
They show how a malicious participant may actively train a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) which
is able to generate prototypical examples of a class held by another agent. While this does not violate DP,
it can still constitute a privacy breach in applications where a class distribution itself is considered private.
We believe that the key features of our approach, namely the fully decentralized architecture and the graph
regularization over personal models, can significantly limit the effectiveness of the above attack. We leave a
careful study of this question for future work.
5 Numerical Experiments
5.1 Linear Classification
We first conduct experiments on a linear classification task introduced by Vanhaesebrouck et al. (2017). We
briefly recall the setup. Consider a set of n = 100 agents. Each of these agents has a target linear separator in
Rp (unknown to the agent). The weight between two agents i and j is given by Wij = exp((cos(φi,j)− 1)/γ),
where φi,j is the angle between the target models and γ = 0.1 (negligible weights are ignored). Each agent i
receives a random number mi of training points (drawn uniformly between 10 and 100), where each point is
drawn uniformly around the origin and labeled according to the target model. We then add some label noise,
independently flipping each label with probability 0.05. We use the logistic loss `(θ;x, y) = log(1+exp(−yθTx))
(which is 1-Lipschitz), and the L2 regularization parameter of an agent i is set to λi = 1/mi > 0 to ensure the
overall strong convexity. The hyperparameter µ is tuned to maximize accuracy of the non-private algorithm
on a validation set of random problems instances. For each agent, the test accuracy of a model is estimated
on a separate sample of 100 points.
Non-private setting: CD vs ADMM. We start by comparing our Coordinate Descent (CD) algorithm to
the ADMM algorithm proposed by Vanhaesebrouck et al. (2017) for the non-private setting. Both algorithms
are fully decentralized and asynchronous, but our algorithm relies on broadcast (one-way communication
from an agent to all neighbors) while the ADMM algorithm is gossip-based (two-way communication between
a node and a random neighbor). Which communication model is the most efficient strongly depends on the
network infrastructure, but we can meaningfully compare the algorithms by tracking the objective value
and the test accuracy with respect to the number of iterations and the number of p-dimensional vectors
transmitted along the edges of the network. Both algorithms are initialized using the purely local models, i.e.
Θi(0) = Θ
loc
i for all i ∈ JnK. Figure 1 shows the results (averaged over 5 runs) for dimension p = 100: our
coordinate descent algorithm significantly outperforms ADMM despite the fact that ADMM makes several
local gradient steps at each iteration (10 in this experiment). We believe that this is mostly due to the fact
that the 4 auxiliary variables per edge needed by ADMM to encode smoothness constraints are updated only
when the associated edge is activated. In contrast, our algorithm does not require auxiliary variables.
Private setting. In this experiment, each agent has the same overall privacy budget ¯i = ¯. It splits its
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privacy budget equally across Ti = T/n iterations using Theorem 1 with δ¯i = exp(−5), and stops updating
when it is done. We first illustrate empirically the trade-offs implied by Theorem 2: namely that running more
iterations per agent reduces the first term of the bound but increases the second term because more noise is
added at each iteration. This behavior is easily seen in Figure 2(a), where Θ(0) is initialized to a constant
vector. In Figure 2(b), we have initialized the algorithm with a private warm start solution with  = 0.05 (see
supplementary material). The results confirm that for a modest additional privacy budget, a good warm
start can lead to lower values of the objective with less iterations (as suggested again by Theorem 2). The
gain in test accuracy here is significant.
Figure 2(c) shows results for problems of increasing difficulty (by varying the dimension p) with various
privacy budgets. We have used the same private warm start strategy as in Figure 2(b), and the number of
iterations per node was tuned based on a validation set of random problems instances. We see that even
under a small privacy budget (¯ = 0.15), the resulting models significantly outperform the purely local models
(a perfectly private baseline). As can be seen in the supplementary material, all agents (irrespective of their
dataset size) get an improvement in test accuracy. This improvement is especially large for users with small
local datasets, effectively correcting for the imbalance in dataset size. We also show that perturbing the data
itself, a.k.a. local DP (Duchi et al., 2012; Kairouz et al., 2016), leads to very inaccurate models.
5.2 Recommendation Task
To illustrate our approach on real-world data, we use MovieLens-100K,7 a popular benchmark dataset for
recommendation systems which consists of 100,000 ratings given by n = 943 users over a set of nitems =
1682 movies. In our setting, each user i corresponds to an agent who only has access to its own ratings
rij1 , . . . , rijmi ∈ R, where j1, . . . , jmi denote the indices of movies rated by agent i. Note that there is a
large imbalance across users: on average, a user has rated 106 movies but the standard deviation is large
(' 100), leading to extreme values (min=20, max=737). For simplicity, we assume that a common feature
representation φj ∈ Rp for each movie j ∈ JnitemsK is known a priori by all agents (p = 20 in our experiments).
The goal of each agent i is to learn a model θi ∈ Rp such that θTi φj is a good estimate for the rating that i
would give to movie j, as measured by the quadratic loss `(θ;φ, r) = (θTφ− r)2. This is a very simple model:
we emphasize that our goal is not to obtain state-of-the-art results on this dataset but to show that our
approach can be used to improve upon purely local models in a privacy-preserving manner. For each agent,
we randomly sample 80% of its ratings to serve as training set and use the remaining 20% as test set. The
network is obtained by setting Wij = 1 if agent i is within the 10-nearest neighbors of agent j (or vice versa)
according to the cosine similarity between their training ratings, and Wij = 0 otherwise. Due to the lack of
space, additional details on the experimental setup are deferred to the supplementary material.
Table 1 shows the test RMSE (averaged over users) for different strategies (for private versions, we use
δ¯i = exp(−5) as in the previous experiment). While the purely local models suffer from large error due to
data scarcity, our approach can largely outperform this baseline in both the non-private and private settings.
6 Conclusion
We introduced and analyzed an efficient algorithm for personalized and peer-to-peer machine learning under
privacy constraints. We argue that this problem is becoming more and more relevant as connected objects
become ubiquitous. Further research is needed to address dynamic scenarios (agents join/leave during the
execution, data is collected on-line, etc.). We will also explore the use of secure multiparty computation
and homomorphic encryption as an alternative/complementary approach to DP in order to provide higher
accuracy at the cost of more computation.
7https://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/100k/
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
This supplementary material is organized as follows. Section A contains the proofs of the results in the main
text. Section B provides further analysis of Theorem 2 for the case where the noise scales are uniform across
iterations. Section C deals with the interesting special case of model propagation and its use as a private
warm start strategy. Finally, Section D presents additional experimental results and details.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We first show that for agent i and an iteration ti ∈ Ti, the additional noise ηi(ti) provides (i(ti), 0)-differential
privacy for the published Θi(ti + 1). In the following, two datasets S1i and S2i are called neighbors if they
differ in a single data point. We denote this neighboring relation by S1i ≈ S2i .
We will need the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. For two neighboring datasets S1i and S2i of the size mi:
‖∇Li(Θi;S1i )−∇Li(Θi;S2i )‖1 ≤
2 · L0
mi
.
Proof. Assume that instead of data point (x1, y1) in S1i , there is (x2, y2) in S2i . As S1i and S2i are neighboring
datasets, the other data points in S1i and S2i are the same. Hence:
‖∇Li(Θi;S1i )−∇Li(Θi;S2i )‖1 =
1
mi
‖∇`(Θi;x1, y1)−∇`(Θi;x2, y2)‖1 ≤ 2 · L0
mi
,
since the L0-Lipschitzness of `(·;x, y) (with respect to the L1-norm) for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y implies that for
any Θi ∈ Rp and (x, y) ∈ X × Y, we have ‖∇`(Θi;x, y)‖1 ≤ L0.
We continue the proof by bounding the sensitivity of Θi(ti + 1) to find the noise scale needed to satisfy
(, 0)-differential privacy. Using Eq. 3, Eq. 4 and Lemma 1, we have:
sensitivity(Θi(ti + 1)) = maxS1i≈S2i
‖Θi(ti + 1)‖1
= max
S1i≈S2i
‖ 1
Li
[∇QL(Θ(ti))]i‖1 (7)
=
µciDii
Li
max
S1i≈S2i
‖∇Li(Θi;S1i )−∇Li(Θi;S2i )‖1 (8)
≤ 2µciDiiL0
miLi
, (9)
where (7)-(8) follow from the fact that [∇QL(Θ(ti))]i is the only quantity in the update (4) which depends
on the local dataset of agent i.
Recalling the relation between sensitivity and the scale of the addition noise in the context of differential
privacy (Dwork et al., 2006), we should have:
i(ti) · s∗i ≥ sensitivity(Θi(ti + 1)) =
2µciDiiL0
miLi
,
where s∗i is the scale of the noise added to Θi(ti + 1). In the following we show that s∗i ≥ 2µciDiiL0miLii(ti) . To
compute s∗i , we see how the noise ηi(ti) affects Θ˜i(ti + 1). Using Eq. 6, definitions of α (Update step page 4)
and Li (the block Lipschitz constant) we have:
Θ˜i(ti + 1) = (1− α)Θi(t) + α
( ∑
j∈Ni
Wij
Dii
Θj(t)− µci(∇Li(Θi(t);Si) + ηi(t))
)
= (1− α)Θi(t) + α
( ∑
j∈Ni
Wij
Dii
Θj(t)− µci∇Li(Θi(t);Si)
)
− αµciηi(t)
= Θi(ti + 1)− µciηi(t)
1 + µciLloci
= Θi(ti + 1)− µciDii
Li
· ηi(ti).
So the scale of the noise added to Θi(ti + 1) is:
s∗i =
µciDii
Li
· si(ti) = µciDii
Li
· 2L0
i(ti)mi
=
2µciDiiL0
i(ti)miLi
.
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Therefore, s∗i ≥ sensitivity(Θi(ti+1))i(ti) is satisfied, hence publishing Θ˜i(ti + 1) is (i(ti), 0)-differentially private.
We have shown that at any iteration ti ∈ Ti, publishing Θ˜i(ti + 1) by agent i is (i(ti), 0) differentially private.
The mechanismMi published all Θ˜i(ti + 1) for ti ∈ Ti. Using the composition result for differential privacy
established by Kairouz et al. (2015), we have that the mechanism Mi(Si) is (¯i, δ¯i)-DP with ¯i, δ¯i as in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 considers the case where `(·;x, y) is L0-Lipschitz for all (x, y) ∈ X ×Y with respect to the L1-norm.
We could instead assume Lipschitzness with respect to the L2-norm, in which case the noise to add should
be Gaussian instead of Laplace. The following remark computes the additional normal noise to preserve
differential privacy in this setting.
Remark 4. Let i ∈ JnK. In the case where `(·;x, y) is L∗0-Lipschitz with respect to the L2-norm for all (x, y) ∈
X × Y, for any ti ∈ Ti, let si(ti) ≥ 2L∗0
√
2 ln(2/δi(ti))/i(ti) for some i(ti) > 0 and δi(ti) ∈ [0, 1]. For the
noise vector ηi(t) drawn from a Gaussian distribution N (0, si(t))p ∈ Rp with scale si(ti), and for any δ¯i ∈ [0, 1]
and initial point Θ˜(0) ∈ Rnp independent of Si, the mechanismMi(Si) is (¯i, 1−(1− δ¯i)
∏Ti
ti=1
(1−δi(ti)))-DP
with
¯i = min
{
Ti∑
ti=1
i(ti),
Ti∑
ti=1
(ei(ti) − 1)i(ti)
ei(ti) + 1
+
√√√√√ Ti∑
ti=1
2i(ti)2 log
(
e+
√∑Ti
ti=1
i(ti)2
δ¯i
)
,
Ti∑
ti=1
(ei(ti) − 1)i(ti)
ei(ti) + 1
+
√√√√ Ti∑
ti=1
2i(ti)2 log(1/δ¯i)
}
.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We start by introducing a convenient lemma.
Lemma 2. For any i ∈ [n], Θ ∈ Rnp and d ∈ Rp we have:
QL(Θ + Uid) ≤ QL(Θ) + dT [∇QL(Θ)]i + Li
2
‖d‖2.
Proof. We get this by applying Taylor’s inequality to the function
qxΘ : Rp → R
d 7→ QL(Θ + Uid).
Recall that the random variable ηi(t) ∈ Rp represents the noise added by agent i ∈ JnK due to privacy
requirements if it wakes up at iteration t ≥ 0. To simplify notations we denote the scaled version of the noise
by η˜i(t) = µDiiciηi(t).
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Let it be the agent waking up at iteration t. Using Lemma 2, we have:
QL(Θ˜(t+ 1)) = QL
(
Θ˜(t)− Uit
Lit
(
[∇QL(Θ˜(t))]it + η˜it(t)
))
≤ QL(Θ˜(t))− 1
Lit
[∇QL(Θ˜(t))]Tit
(
[∇QL(Θ˜(t))]it + η˜it(t)
)
+
1
2Lit
‖[∇QL(Θ˜(t))]it + η˜it(t)‖2
= QL(Θ˜(t))− 1
Lit
‖[∇QL(Θ˜(t))]it‖2 +
1
2Lit
‖[∇QL(Θ˜(t))]it‖2 +
1
2Lit
‖η˜it(t)‖2
≤ QL(Θ˜(t))− 1
2Lmax
‖[∇QL(Θ˜(t))]it‖2 +
1
2Lmin
‖η˜it(t)‖2,
where Lmin = min1≤i≤n Li.
Recall that under our Poisson clock assumption, each agent is equally likely to wake up at any step t.
Subtracting Q∗L and taking the expectation with respect to it on both sides, we thus get:
E
it
[QL(Θ˜(t+ 1))]−Q∗L ≤ QL(Θ˜(t))−Q∗L −
1
2Lmax
1
n
n∑
j=1
‖[∇QL(Θ˜(t))]j‖2
+
1
2Lmin
1
n
n∑
j=1
‖η˜j(t)‖2
= QL(Θ˜(t))−Q∗L −
1
2nLmax
‖∇QL(Θ˜(t))‖2 + 1
2nLmin
‖η˜(t)‖2, (10)
where η˜(t) = [η˜1(t); . . . , ; η˜n(t)] ∈ Rnp.
For convenience, let us define Pt = E[QL(Θ˜(t))]−Q∗L where E[·] denotes the expectation with respect to all
variables {it}t≥0 and {η(t)}t≥0. Using (10) we thus have:
Pt+1 ≤ Pt − 1
2nLmax
E[‖∇QL(Θ˜(t))‖2] + 1
2nLmin
E[‖η˜(t)‖2] (11)
Recall that QL is σ-strongly convex, i.e. for any Θ,Θ′ ∈ Rnp we have:
QL(Θ′) ≥ QL(Θ) +∇QL(Θ)T (Θ′ −Θ) + σ
2
‖Θ′ −Θ‖22.
We minimize the above inequality on both sides with respect to Θ′. We obtain that Θ′ = Θ∗ minimizes the
left-hand side, while Θ′ = Θ−∇QL(Θ)/σ. We thus have for any Θ:
Q∗L ≥ QL(Θ)−
1
σ
∇QL(Θ)T∇QL(Θ) + 1
2σ
‖∇QL(Θ)‖22 = QL(Θ)−
1
2σ
‖∇QL(Θ)‖2.
Using the above inequality to bound ‖∇QL(Θ˜(t))‖2 in (11), we obtain:
Pt+1 ≤ Pt − σ
nLmax
Pt +
1
2nLmin
E[‖η˜(t)‖2] =
(
1− σ
nLmax
)
Pt +
1
2nLmin
E[‖η˜(t)‖2].
A simple recursion on Pt gives:
Pt ≤
(
1− σ
nLmax
)t
P0 +
1
2nLmin
t−1∑
t′=0
(
1− σ
nLmax
)t′
E[‖η˜(t′)‖2]. (12)
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For any t ≥ 0 and i ∈ JnK, the entries of ηi(t) are drawn from independent Laplace distributions with mean 0
and scale si(t), hence we have:
E[‖η˜(t)‖2] = E
[
n∑
i=1
‖µDiiciηi(t)‖2
]
=
n∑
i=1
2(µDiicisi(t))
2.
This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We start the proof with the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let C = 1− σ/nLmax. Assume that for any i ∈ JnK, we have si(ti) = 2L0i(ti)mi for ti ∈ Ti as in
Theorem 1. Given a total number of iterations T and the overall privacy budgets ¯1, . . . , ¯n > 0 of each agent,
the following privacy parameters minimize the utility loss:
∗i (t) =
3
√
C − 1
3
√
CT − 1
3
√
Ct¯i, ∀i ∈ JnK, 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
Proof. Denote Ai = µciDiiL0mi . As the first part of the upper-bound of the utility loss in Theorem 2 does not
depend on the i(t)’s, we need to find the i(t)’s which minimize the following quantity:
min
T−1∑
t=0
n∑
i=1
(
1− σ
nLmax
)t(
µciDiisi(t)
)2
= min
T−1∑
t=0
n∑
i=1
(
1− σ
nLmax
)t(2µciDiiL0
i(ti)mi
)2
= min
T−1∑
t=0
Ct
( n∑
i=1
A2i
2i (t)
)
= min
n∑
i=1
( T−1∑
t=0
A2iC
t
2i (t)
)
, (13)
under the constraints: ∀i, i(t) ≥ 0 and
∑T−1
t=0 i(t) = ¯i. As the agents are independent, we can solve
the above optimization problem separately for each agent i to minimize
∑T−1
t=0
A2iC
t
(i(t))2
under the constraint∑T−1
t=0 i(t) = ¯i. Denote i(t) = xit. We have xi0 = ¯i −
∑T−1
t=1 xit. Replacing xi0 in the objective function of
Eq. 13, we can write the objective function as follows:
∀i : Fi(xi1, · · · , xiT−1) = A
2
i
(¯i −
∑T−1
t=1 xit)
2
+
T−1∑
t=1
A2iC
t
x2it
.
The problem is thus equivalent to finding minFi(xi1, · · · , xit−1) ∀i under the previous constraints. To find
the optimal xit we find set its partial derivative ∂Fi∂xit to 0:
∂Fi
∂xit
=
−2A2iCt
x3it
+
2A2i
(¯i −
∑T−1
t=1 xit)
3
= 0.
Hence the value of xit satisfies:
∀t ∈ [1 : T − 1] : xit = 3
√
Ct
(
¯i −
T−1∑
j=1
xij
)
. (14)
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For a fixed i, after summing up all xits, we get:
T−1∑
j=1
xij =
( T−1∑
j=1
3
√
Cj
)(
¯i −
T−1∑
j=1
xij
)
=
3
√
CT − 3√C
3
√
C − 1
(
¯i −
T−1∑
j=1
xij
)
.
And hence:
xi0 = ¯i −
T−1∑
j=1
xij =
3
√
C − 1
3
√
CT − 1 ¯i.
Using Eq. 14, we thus finally get:
∀i, t : ∗i (t) =
3
√
C − 1
3
√
CT − 1
3
√
Ct¯i
The noise allocation strategy given by the above lemma optimizes the utility loss, which is an expectation
with respect to the clock ticks. Hence ∗i (t) gives the amount of noise that an agent should add in expectation
at a given global iteration t. Note that we have
∑T−1
t=0 
∗
i (t) = ¯i, hence the budget is matched exactly in
expectation. For a particular run of the algorithm however, each agent i only wakes up at a subset Ti of
all iterations and only uses its privacy budget at these iterations t ∈ Ti. Thus, for a single run, the above
strategy does not use up the entire privacy budget ¯i.
If we instead condition on a particular schedule, i.e. each agent i knows Ti in advance, we can appropriately
renormalize the privacy parameters to make sure that the agents truly utilize their entire privacy budget.
The overall privacy parameter for agent i with optimal noise allocation as in Lemma 3 given Ti is as follows:∑
t∈Ti
∗i (t) = λTi(i) · ¯i.
Hence we can set ∑
t∈Ti
i(t) =
∑
t∈Ti
∗i (t)
λTi(i)
= ¯i.
This shows that the privacy parameters defined in Proposition 2 fulfills the overall privacy budget of
an agent i during the iterations that agent i wakes up. Furthermore, for ∗i (t) defined in Lemma 3,∑T−1
t=0 
∗
i (t) = ¯i ∀i ∈ JnK. We then conclude that λTi(i) ≤ 1 as Ti ⊆ JT K. The additional noise to provide
i(t) differential privacy (as in Proposition 3) is thus lower than the additional noise to provide ∗i (t) differential
privacy in Lemma 3.
B Further Analysis of Theorem 2
We further analyze the utility/privacy trade-off of Theorem 2 in the special case where the noise scales are
uniform across iterations, i.e. si(t) = si for all t and i. Let us denote
a =
1
nLmin
n∑
i=1
(µDiicisi)
2, b = QL(Θ(0))−Q∗L, ρ =
σ
nLmax
.
The additive error due to the noise is a sum of a geometric series and thus simplifies to
T−1∑
t=0
a(1− ρ)t = a
(
1− (1− ρ)T
ρ
)
.
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Hence we can write the inequality of Theorem 2 as
E [QL(Θ(T ))−Q?L] ≤ b(1− ρ)T︸ ︷︷ ︸
optimization error
+
a
ρ
(
1− (1− ρ)T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise error
.
The optimization error after T iterations thus decomposes into two terms: an optimization error term (which
is the same quantity that one gets in the non-private setting) and a noise error term due to privacy. One can
see that if the algorithm is run until convergence (T →∞), the (additive) utility loss due to privacy is given
by
a
ρ
=
Lmax
σLmin
n∑
i=1
(µDiicisi)
2.
However, this additive loss due to noise can actually be smaller than aρ for T < ∞. Indeed, increasing T
from 0 to ∞ makes the noise error go from 0 to aρ , but also drives the optimization error from b to 0. This
suggests that the number of iterations T can be used to minimize the overall error and should be carefully
tuned. This is confirmed by our numerical experiments in Figures 2(a)-2(b).
C Propagation of (Private) Local Models
In this section, we give some details on an interesting special case of our framework. The idea is to smooth
models that are pre-trained locally by each agent. Formally, the objective function to minimize is as follows:
QMP (Θ) = 1
2
( n∑
i<j
Wij‖Θi −Θj‖2 + µ
n∑
i=1
Diici‖Θi −Θloci ‖
2
)
, (15)
which is a special case of (2) when we set Li(Θi;Si) = 12‖Θi −Θloci ‖
2 with Θloci ∈ arg minθ∈Rp
∑mi
j=1 `(θ;x
j
i , y
j
i )+
λi‖θ‖2. Each Li is 1-strongly convex in Θi with 1-Lipschitz continuous gradient, hence we have Li = Dii(1+µci)
and σ ≥ µmin1≤i≤n[Diici].
Developing the update step (4) for this special case, we get:
Θi(t+ 1) =
1
1 + µci
( ∑
j∈Ni
Wij
Dii
Θj(t) + µciΘ
loc
i
)
. (16)
Because the objective function (15) is quadratic and separable along the p dimensions, (16) corresponds to
the exact minimizer of QMP along the block coordinate direction Θi. Hence Θi(t+ 1) does not depend on
Θi(t), but only on the solitary and neighboring models.
It turns out that we recover the update rule proposed specifically by Vanhaesebrouck et al. (2017) for model
propagation. Our block coordinate algorithm thus generalizes their approach to general local loss functions
and allows to obtain convergence rate instead of only asymptotic convergence.
Private setting In the above objective, the interaction with each local dataset Si is only through the
pre-trained model Θloci learned by minimizing the (regularized) empirical risk as denoted in (1). Therefore, if
we generate a DP version Θ˜loci of Θloci , we can run the non-private coordinate descent algorithm (16) using
Θ˜loci instead of Θloci without degrading the privacy guarantee. We can thus avoid the dependency on the
number of iterations of the coordinate descent algorithm. Several well-documented methods for an agent
to generate a DP version of its local model Θloci exist in the literature, under mild assumptions on the loss
function and regularizer. One may for instance use output or objective perturbation (Chaudhuri et al., 2011).
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Figure 3: Final test accuracy (averaged over 5 runs) per local dataset size for dimension p = 100 and several
privacy regimes for our private and non-private coordinate descent algorithms. Agents with small datasets
get larger improvements. Best seen in color.
Recall that Theorem 2 emphasizes that it is beneficial to have a good warm start point Θ(0) for the general
algorithm: the smaller QL(Θ(0))−Q?L, the less iterations needed to decrease the optimization error to the
desired precision and hence the less noise added due to privacy. However, to ensure the overall privacy of the
algorithm, Θ(0) must be also be differentially private. In light of the discussion above, we can use the private
model propagation solution as a good private warm start.
D Additional Experimental Results and Details
D.1 Linear classification
We present here some additional experimental results on the linear classification task to complement those
displayed in the main text.
Test accuracy w.r.t. size of local dataset Figure 3 shows the test accuracy of our algorithm under
different private regimes depending on the size of the local dataset of an agent. First, we can see that all
agents (irrespective of their dataset size) benefit from private collaborative learning, in the sense that their
final accuracy is larger than that of their purely local model. This is important as it gives an incentive to all
agents (including those with larger datasets) to collaborate. Second, the algorithm effectively corrects for the
imbalance in dataset size: agents with less data generally get a larger boost in accuracy and can almost catch
up with better-endowed agents (which also get an improvement, albeit smaller).
Local Differential Privacy baseline As mentioned in Section 4, local Differential Privacy (Duchi et al.,
2012; Kairouz et al., 2016) consists in adding noise to each data point itself (proportional to the sensitivity of
its features) so that the resulting perturbed point does not reveal too much about the original point. Local
DP can be used trivially in the distributed/decentralized setting as it is purely local. However it is also a very
conservative approach as it is agnostic to the type of analysis done on the data (the perturbed dataset can
be released publicly). Figure 4 shows the accuracy of purely local models learned after applying (, 0)-local
DP to each local dataset. As expected, the loss in accuracy compared to purely local models learned from
unperturbed data is huge. We were not able to improve significantly over these models by applying our
collaborative learning algorithm on the perturbed data, confirming that it contains mostly random noise.
This confirms the relevance of our private algorithm based on perturbing the updates rather than the data
itself.
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Figure 4: Test accuracy (averaged over 5 runs) of purely local models learned from perturbed data (local
DP) w.r.t. to data dimension, for different privacy regimes. Best seen in color.
D.2 Recommendation Task
We provide here some details on our experimental setup for MovieLens-100K:
• Normalization: Following standard practice, we normalize the data user-wise by subtracting from
each rating the average rating of the associated user.
• Movie features: In principle, for privacy reasons, the features should be computed independently of
the training data (e.g., computed from a separate set of user ratings, or descriptive features obtained
from IMDB). For convenience, we simply use the movie features generated by a classic alternating least
square method for collaborative filtering (Zhou et al., 2008) applied to our training set (i.e., random
80% of the ratings). We set the feature dimensionality p to 20 as it is typically enough to reach good
performance on MovieLens-100K.
• Lipschitz constant: One can bound the Lipschitz constant of the quadratic loss by assuming a bound
on the norm of model parameters and movie features. However, this often results in overestimating
the Lipschitz constant and hence in an unnecessarily large scale for the added noise used to enforce
differential privacy. In such cases it is easier to clip the norm of all point-wise gradients when they
exceed a constant C (see for instance Abadi et al., 2016). This ensures that (9) holds (replacing L0 by
C). We set C = 10, which is large enough that gradients are almost never clipped in practice.
• Hyperparameters: We simply set the L2 regularization parameter of each agent i to λi = 1/mi,
and use µ = 0.04 as in the previous synthetic experiment. For our private algorithm, the number of
iterations per node is tuned for each value of ¯ on a validation set (obtained by a 80/20 random split of
the training set of each agent).
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